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Liberalised Belgian Telecommunication Policy: 
Balancing between social ambitions and competitive desires1 
 
Bart Cammaerts & Jean-Claude Burgelman 
Studies on Media Information & Telecommunication (SMIT) 
 
<Free University of Brussels> 
 
Just as in the rest of Europe, the outlook of the Belgian telecommunications 
sector has changed dramatically over the last 10 years (Burgelman et al, 1995). 
The sector as been transformed from a completely state controlled single 
operator monopoly model towards a more or less totally privatised competitive 
model. This article looks at some reasons for this shift but also at the results more 
than a year after the magic 1998, when full competition in most EU member 
states had to be a fact.  
 
Although this (r)evolution has to be seen in a European context (Burgelman, 
1997) this article will mainly focus on the Belgian situation. However, the 
European context is not mentioned without purpose. Indeed, Europe played a 
major role in swaying member states to open up their telecommunications 
market . There were also European budgetary criteria that gently pushed 
member states to privatise ‘their’ public telecom operators (PTO’s).  
 
Before looking at the role of the EU, let’s first assess the reasons for liberalisation 
and privatisation. As in other cases it is not one compelling reason, but indeed a 
complex of economic and political factors, which led to the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. The most important are: the 
explosive growth of the service sector resulting in a growing telecom demand; a 
diversified demand pattern of more exigent (professional) users with specialised 
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needs; the lack of innovative efficiency and quality of service of the PTO’s; 
technological innovations in transmission techniques and capacity; the 
emergence of value added services such as the Internet; an almost de facto 
universal service, and last but not least the changing perception of state owned 
or led economies.  
 
The role of the EU in this respect has been that of a catalyst. The publication of 
the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment in 1987 represented the beginning of a long liberalisation 
process which accumulated in what has become known as the ONP-directive 
and the subsequent opening of the voice telephony market in 1998 (European 
Commission, 1987 - European Council, 1995).  
 
It was in great part the pressure of the European Commission and more precisely 
the Directorate General XIII under Martin Bangemann, responsible for industrial 
policy and information and telecommunication technologies, that influenced the 
speed of change. His main priority was the liberalisation of infrastructure and 
minimisation of public intervention; “The market will drive (...) the prime task of 
government is to safeguard competitive forces.” (HLGIS, 1994: 9). Often when 
referring to the reasons of liberalisation economic or technological causes are 
given, thereby forgetting that governments, institutions, regulation and ideology 
do play an equally important role in the process. For years the privatisation of 
what used to be called a natural monopoly was unthinkable or cross-subsidies 
between profitable and unprofitable activities was seen as quite evident. The 
acceptance of market logic into almost every fibre of society reflects a changing 
of minds and refers indeed to profound changes in economy and society.  
 
Whether this is a good or a bad thing remains to be seen. The problem is that 
current debate on this issue easily strands into dichotomous ideological, and thus 
very normative, disputes. Globalisation, for instance, is seen by some to be the 
cause of all societies evils, for others we are moving towards a better ‘borderless’ 
world thanks to globalisation (Observatoire de la Mondialisation, 1997 – Omhae, 
1990). In the same way concerning liberalisation two models or schools emerge. 
Robin Mansell (1993) defined them as being the idealist model and the strategic 
model. For the idealists full liberalisation and free trade on all levels is a 
precondition to economic growth and prosperity for all. Moreover interventions 
by public authorities have a restraining, rather than an enabling, effect on 
economic growth and welfare (HLGIS, 1994). Strategists on the other hand will 
point to the reality of the market with mergers, oligopolies, market failure, 
regulatory capture, etc. thereby stressing the prime importance of regulation by 
independent regulators (Melody, 1997). The challenge for the future to come lies 
in finding ways to overcome these dichotomies, which from a theoretical point of 
view is easier said than done. 
 
When reviewing the liberalisation of telecom in Europe, it becomes apparent that 
policymakers did not follow the neo-liberal stance of DG-XIII 
(telecommunication) blindly. They chose to walk that precarious middle line, 
hovering between idealist and strategic scenarios. On the one hand favouring 
liberalisation and (semi) privatisation, but on the other hand allowing member 
states to reregulate the sector within a minimum/maximum framework. This is 
called the subsidiarity-principle, which means that the general rules are laid 
down by Europe, but the details are to be filled in by the individual states. In 
practice this stance led to a situation whereby major discrepancies exist between 
member states in implementing the general liberalisation concept. In the Belgian 
context for instance the former Christian democrat/socialist government was 
rather reluctant towards full liberalisation. As will be shown industrial policy, 
social policies and ideology can be seen as prime reasons for the Belgian reserves 
vis-à-vis liberalisation.  
 
However, as the Belgian government has traditionally been very dedicated to 
Europe, it followed the minimum European agenda scrupulously, sometimes a 
bit late, but never too early. In 1995 government sold off 49,9% of Belgacom, the 
incumbent PTO, to ADBS a consortium of Ameritech, Tele Denmark and 
Singapore Telecom. Although the government declared2 that this move was 
intended to consolidate Belgacoms position for the century to come, lowering the 
public debt to be able to qualify for European Monetary Union also played a 
mayor role. The remaining 50,1% will most likely be sold by the present 
liberal/socialist/green government. And again, lowering  public debt is a main 
driver for it.  
 
Earlier in 1991 the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications (BIPT), the 
regulator, was put into place, but remained under the responsibility of the 
minister of telecommunication who is also in charge of Belgacom, the former 
PTO3. This widely criticised conflict of interest resulted in the BIPT having to 
deal permanently with interests and problems which a regulator should not take 
care of.  
 
More in particular it might explain why, whereas in most countries asymmetrical 
regulation refers to favouring  new entrants, in the Belgian context this refers  to 
favouring the incumbent operator. Some examples: 
 
- In the run-up to liberalisation government decided to suspend the 
monopoly compensations that Belgacom had to pay to the state for the 
year 1996 and 1997, this because a number of services had already been 
liberalised (terminal equipment, mobile telephony, value added services, 
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 of March 1991 concerning the reform of some economic state enterprises 
etc.)4. In 1994 the monopoly compensation amounted to 2,65 billion BF 
(Belgacom, 1995: 28).  
- Universal service has to be assured on the whole of the Belgian territory 
and thus tailored to Belgacom, the only fixed operator present in every 
region of federal Belgium5. As it is almost impossible for a new entrant to 
cover the whole territory, Belgacom became and still is the legal universal 
service operator. Some observers warn that universal service providers 
may have a competitive advantage, especially as they are often also the 
incumbent and thus dominant operator (Blackman, 1995 – Verhoest, 2000).  
- Number portability, essential with regard to competition, was repeatedly 
postponed. The government even asked the European Commission to 
postpone the deadline of 31 December 1999 for implementing number 
portability because Belgacom presumably had difficulties coping with Y2K 
and portability at the same time. Karel Van Miert, EC-Commissioner for 
competition (DG-IV) at that moment, refused (FET, 25/06/1999).  
- It was the same EC-Commissioner who forced Belgacom to pay 9 billion 
BF., the same amount as the new entrant Mobistar had to pay for its licence 
to become the second mobile operator next to Proximus, the first mobile 
operator and a direct subsidiary of Belgacom (FET, 08/06/1996).  
- For some time now all the major Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
Belgacoms subsidiary Skynet excepted, have moved towards competitors 
of Belgacom. UUnet for instance moved to WorldCom. These competitors 
and the ISPs gained a lot from internet traffic because of interconnection 
agreements with Belgacom. In March of 1998 Belgacom introduced cheaper 
tariffs for Internet communication based on a non-geographic prefix which 
can only be used on Belgacoms network and falls outside the voice 
telephony-interconnection agreements (FET, 16/03/1999). A coalition of 6 
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operators; Unisource, WorldCom, Versatel, Telenet, British Telecom and 
Mobistar, filed a complaint to the Belgian antitrust authority (De Morgen, 
23/04/1999). The Government and the regulator BIPT endorsed Belgacoms 
move. Eric Van Heesvelde, the general-administrator of BIPT, stated; 
“other ISPs have other advantages, They can keep their subscription fees 
low thanks to revenues they get from other operators. Skynet does not 
have this advantage (…) We think this system is not distorting the 
market”6 (De Morgen, 18/03/1999) 
 
However, there are good reason’s too why policy in Belgium, tended to favour 
the dominant incumbent operator. From an industrial policy point of view, 
policy makers fared that being the operator of a very small country at the heart of 
the EU, this would be a very easy pray for the big players in the global market. 
Hence an aggressive take over, it was feared, would obstruct the political wish of 
the then government to “force” Belgacom into performing social tasks that go 
beyond universal service obligations. We can refer to regulation that limits the 
operators ability to fully disconnect people who can’t pay their bills, regulation 
to provide cheap internet ISDN-connections for schools, libraries and hospitals or 
free calling time for people on welfare. A final reason for the partially friendly 
policy towards the incumbent is that Belgacom was and still is one of the biggest 
employers in the country. It employs some 23.600 people whereas the most 
successful new entrant, the cable telephone operator Telenet, has no more than 
420 people on its pay list (Belgacom, 1998 – Telenet, 1999). No doubt that the 
high unemployment, especially in the economically poorer south of Belgium 
(Wallonia), pushed the southern (social democrat) minister of telecommunication 
to protect Belgacom. As such ideology and political strategies played its part in 
the process too.  
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It is still too early to review the stance of the new government towards the 
dominant position of Belgacom.  But it can easily be predicted that, given the 
redressing of the economy and the need to obtain the so valued Maastricht norm 
in budgetary affairs, the telecommunications field will be regulated in a more 
market-oriented way. When assessing the Belgian telecom market with regard to 
the effectiveness of liberalisation the prospects are ambiguous. 
 
On the mobile market three fully operational national operators emerged: 
Proximus (owned by Belgacom), Mobistar (mainly a France Telecom venture) 
and the recent KPN-Orange (a Dutch-UK consortium). As in every other 
European country the market of mobile telephony has expanded exponentially 
over the last few years. In Belgium the market grew to 1,7 million customers in 
five years time, 17% of the population now uses GSM (Ombudsdienst voor 
Telecommunicatie, 1999: 737). Prices have come down, which can be attributed to 
more competition. But, compared to fixed telephony, calling mobile is still very 
expensive. Furthermore interconnection regulation makes that tariff structures 
are misleading. Calling to another operator and especially to and from the fixed 
network often costs a lot more than the advertised price/minute within the same 
network. Consumer complaints about the lack of transparency of prices are 
common (Ombudsdienst voor Telecommunicatie, 1999: 73). It is also unclear 
whether the growing success of GSM has to do with increased competition or the 
gradual ‘social’ acceptance of calling mobile in every day life. 
 
On the fixed front the prospects are even more ambiguous. As it represents an 
enormous investment to build a fixed network, competition in this field mainly 
comes from alternative infrastructures. Cable telephony has in recent years 
proven to be the main competitor of the copper based telephone network. 
Belgium has an exceptionally high penetration rate when it comes to cable 
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television; almost 90% (OECD, 1999: 127). In Flanders, the north, the regional 
government together with Electrabel, the private gas & electricity monopoly 
holder, US West (which later became MediaOne) and several local governments 
set up Telenet. The main aim of Telenet is to offer internet and telephone services 
to cable TV customers. Because the Flemish government was directly involved 
telecom policy in Belgium became entangled in regional conflicts (Lobet & van 
Bastelaer, 1996: 94 – Verhoest, 1995: 638 – Pierson, 1997). In this regard Telenet 
got support from the Flemish government and Belgacom from the Federal 
government. Besides this paralysing political conflict, competition between the 
two operators has been very weak up until now. Partly because of expensive 
interconnection agreements, partly because number portability is not yet in 
place, but also partly because Telenet is not performing well (very slow roll out 
of the network). That most probably inspired Telenet’s general director recently 
to quit (De Morgen, 30/08/1999). Moreover, MediaOne (AT&T) who owns 25% 
of Telenet, wants to pull out presumably in order to concentrate their efforts on 
the US market (FET, 24/08/1999).  
 
On the other hand it is very difficult to deny the fact that Belgacom got support 
from the Federal government who, unlike the Flemish government, was and is 
competent for telecom policy. The main consequence for the Belgian residential 
user of favouring the dominant operator is that they still pay more or less the 
highest tariffs for telecommunication services in Europe (cf. Fig.1). What in turn, 
partially explains the relatively low internet connections in this country (cf. 
Fig.2). 
Fig. 1: Annual Residential Spending on Telecom & Number of Licensed Operators8 
 
 
Fig. 2: Comparative Overview of Internet Use, # of Hosts and Websites
9
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  (*) OECD, 1999: 86-88 (figures july 1998)  
 (**) NUA Internet Surveys, figures from October-November 1998 (estimates based on surveys) 
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Sweden excluded there seems to be a link between the number of operators and 
the average annual cost of telecommunication services. However, compared to 
international tariffs and business use, overall prices for average residential use 
have not come down (yet). As the European consumer organisation BEUC states; 
“The 1998 telecommunications liberalisation has not yet had the effect of giving 
the consumer a choice. The average telephone bill for EU consumers has not 
decreased. Due to the increase in subscription rates, the overall expenditure of 
the average EU consumer on telecommunications services has actually 
increased.” (BEUC, 1998: 2). So, a regular user, who mostly calls local, has not 
seen many positive effects from the introduction of competition in the telecom 
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sector. In other cases, such as that of British Telecom, empirical evidence also 
suggests that the average residential user might be worse off, and this because 
operators were allowed to adjust their tariffs to the real costs and because 
competitors are only interested in the long-distance market and in business users 
(Galal et al, 1994: 99). It is also often said that competition and liberalisation leads 
to a more efficient and client friendly service. Statistics from the Belgian 
Mediation Service for telecommunication suggests that this is not always the case 
(cf. Fig. 3). The number of complaints has risen substantially over the last years.  
 
Fig. 3: Number of Complaints to the Mediation Service for Telecommunication10 
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This rise could be explained by the fact that more people know the procedures to 
formulate a complaint. The independent mediation service for 
telecommunication also became competent to reveal the identity of stalkers. But, 
as Edgard Vandebosch, the Commissioner responsible for the mediation service, 
points out, the competitive context should be seen as a very important cause; 
“The pressure of shareholders is very high. The only thing that counts are two 
digit growth figures. This inevitably leads operators to economise on services 
which don’t pay. We see this happen with customer services who don’t sell 
anything, they are the first to suffer.” Another element is the pressure to 
innovate. New products and services are launched too fast, whereby (technical) 
problems arise, which in turn creates an overload for customer services and 
helplines. As Edgard Vandebosch states; “The productcycle has become way too 
short”. Another factor which influenced the number of complaints is the 
introduction by Belgacom of new software and itemised bills. However, the 
Commissioner also wishes to stress the positive aspects of liberalisation; “there 
are of course more services to choose from then before”11. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Liberalisation clearly made the Belgian telecommunications sector more 
responsive to market needs, more innovative and more service friendly. 
However, the main beneficiary here is the business user since it is so that, for 
mobile as well as for fixed telephony and hence internet, the residential user still 
has to pay a high price. 
 
It is therefore clear that telecommunications policy has to be geared much more 
towards the specific needs and interests of residential users. In the short run this 
has to lead to better services, lower prices and more responsiveness.  
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 On the long run policy should also start to think about the emerging conflict  
between sector-specific regulation and more general regulatory rules such as 
competition policy. This conflict is the subject of current debate regarding the 
‘1999 review on regulatory principles for communications infrastructures and 
associated services’ and opposes DG-IV (competition) to DG-XIII 
(telecommunication). The former acting upon general competition rules, the 
latter defending sector specific regulation. As was the case in the Belgian context, 
the EC-Commissioner for competition (DG-IV) intervenes regularly, thereby 
overruling national sector-specific regulation. The dominant, often incumbent, 
operators must be watched scrupulously so that they are unable to abuse their 
dominant marketpower, especially towards the ‘weaker’ residential user.  
 
However, there is also a strong case to be made for sector-specific regulation. 
Communication is also a public good, it is not a mere economic product. In this 
sense social regulation is necessary and even essential. In the Belgian context for 
instance, the dominant operator Belgacom is forced to perform social tasks that 
go beyond the universal service framework. This conflict between sector-specific 
and competition policy will prove to be the main challenge for the years to come. 
Policymakers must find a middle ground to reconcile competition on the one 
hand and (social) sector-specific regulation on the other hand.  
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